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Synopsis
In Hong Kong, getting paid is not always 
easy and the construction industry stands 
as an illustration on how much effort 
may be needed to achieve this and how 
adverse impacts can escalate from payment 
problems. At the moment, many jurisdictions 
have adopted some form of legislation or 
practice measures to enhance the ease and 
security of payment in the construction 
industry. Experience and insights from their 
operations provide guidance to Hong Kong 
for its way forward.
Through studying practices and feedback 
in other jurisdictions, this article outlines 
and reviews the options and alternatives 
implemented for securing payment in the 
construction industry in Hong Kong.
In addition, it also seeks to appraise their 
respective practicability for Hong Kong and 
highlight those areas to be considered if 
they are to be adopted or adapted for use 
in the Hong Kong construction industry. 
The ultimate aim is to provide an objective, 
balanced and reasoned overview for further 
study and discussion among stakeholders in 
the Hong Kong construction industry when 
moving forward.
This is not intended to be an exhaustive 
review of all means adopted to achieve 
security 
of payment 
b u t  a i m s  t o 
discuss those methods 
which are more likely to 
be able to be adopted in Hong 
Kong in the light of the circumstances 
and environment prevailing in Hong Kong. 
Further, this paper is not investigating 
into the many modes of procurement that 
are available and which may address the 
concern of security of payment but focuses 
on the traditional form of contracts in use in 
Hong Kong. PPP or PFI from which would 
call for different discussions is not covered.
Introduction
In the late 1990s, after the uncovering of 
several non-compliant construction incidents 
in Hong Kong that prompted widespread 
public concern, all stakeholders in the 
construction industry took up the chance to 
take a critical review of the practices and 
culture of the industry and explored paths 
for reform. In April 2000, the Chief Executive 
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Reg ion appoin ted the Cons t ruc t ion 
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Industry Review Committee (“CIRC”) to 
comprehensively review the current state of 
the industry and to recommend improvement 
measures. The output was published in 2001 
in the report titled Construct for Excellence: 
Report of the Construction Industry Review 
Committee.
The Hong Kong construction industry 
has several described features that are 
not uncommon in construction industry 
elsewhere. In the Hong Kong CIRC report, 
it has been stated: “Local construction 
activities are labour-intensive, dangerous and 
polluting. Built products are seldom defect-
free. Construction costs are comparatively 
high. The industry is very fragmented 
and is beset with an adversarial culture. 
Many industry participants adopt a short-
term view on business development, with 
little interest in enhancing their long-term 
competitiveness. There is a tendency to 
award contracts to the lowest bidders and 
delivery programmes are often unrealistically 
compressed. Accountability is undermined 
by the prevalence of non-value adding multi-
layered subcontracting and lax supervision. 
An inadequately trained workforce also 
impairs the industry’s ability to adopt 
new technologies and to cope with new 
challenges.” As observed in the Report, the 
delivery of a construction project is a highly 
complex process, involving multi-disciplinary 
inputs provided by a vast number of 
participants from tradesmen, technicians, 
supervisors, professionals, consultants, 
con t rac to r s and sub-con t rac to r s , to 
employers and the authorities. A number of 
common key problems were also identified. 
Those re la t ing pr imari ly to payment 
problems are the lack of a more employer-
focused approach, the tendency to 
award contracts to lowest bidders, 
the short- term att i tude to 
business development, the 
non value-adding multi-layered 
sub-contracting, declining productivity 
growth and high building costs, and the 
fragmentation and adversarial culture within 
the industry.
A total of 109 recommendations were 
made in the Report in almost every aspect 
of the construction industry. In answer 
to these, the Provisional Construction 
Industry Co-ordination Board (“PCICB”) 
was established on 28 September 2001 to 
spearhead industry reforms and to propagate 
a new culture of change. In February 2007, 
the new Construction Industry Council was 
established to take the matters forward.
Indeed, many of these problems stem from 
long-established practices and processes 
and arise out of certain inherent features of 
the Hong Kong construction industry. The 
construction industry can be characterized as 
an amalgamation of a multitude of chained 
operations, often with limited and unsecured 
capital backing. Construction activities are 
often subject to a high level of technical and 
economic risks. Tender prices are typically 
prepared in a limited time period and inserted 
with intangible uncertainties on the basis of 
technical and financial assumptions which 
affect the ultimate pricing. Contractors are 
paid in arrears. The typical interim payment 
arrangements result in works being paid at 
least two months after execution. Advanced 
capital funding for the works by overdrafts, 
trade credits or other interim means as the 
works progress become unavoidable. Sub-
contractors are often engaged to reduce the 
risk or need for such advance funding. Multi-
layering sub-contractor becomes a common 
phenomenon. In the end, the toil and sweat 
of the workers usually provide a significant 
contribution to the capital that has to be 
advanced for the completion of the works.
Most, if not all, of the contractors are 
unsecured creditors of the parties for whom 
they have contracted to work. Contractors 
do not have a lien over the property they 
have built even if they are unpaid and the 
contractual licence granted to them to 
remain on site can be revoked by the project 
owner at any time so long as an undertaking 
as to damages i s provided when an 
injunctive relief from the court is obtained. 
Hence, cascade of payments from the project 
owners from the top downward, all the way 
to the workers, is critical for the cashflow to 
all concerned and livelihood of the workers. 
Cashflow management is essential to the 
survival of contractors and sub-contractors. 
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The business viability of contractors and 
sub-contractors depends more upon 
cashflow than profit margins. The existence 
of a stable and healthy labour market is also 
dependent on the cashflow emanating from 
the employers.
More importantly, it is the prospects of 
prompt payment for completed works that 
offer a strong incentive to contractors and 
sub-contractors to deliver quality service5. 
Under the current arrangement, if payments 
are not forthcoming from the employer to 
the contractor, all lower-tier sub-contractors, 
suppliers and workers would suffer. Further, 
sub-contracts typically provide for ‘pay 
when paid’ or ‘back to back’ arrangement 
for progress payments. Thus, even when 
payments have been promptly effected 
by the employer to the contractor, there 
is no effective means to ensure that such 
payments can flow down through the sub-
contractors to the workers. Any diversion of 
monies received under the project for other 
purposes by a party along the chain would 
result in an interruption of the cashflow, 
leaving the lower tiered sub-contractors and 
workers at peril.
Without the certainty and security of 
timely and fair payments for works done 
or materials supplied, problems in other 
aspects of the works such as quality, delay 
and safety, etc. are highly likely to 
arise. Without an effective 
mechanism to ensure 
the uninterrupted 
cascade of 
payment down the chain and for any 
such interruption of payment be detected 
timeously, any measure of security of 
payment may still be of no utility to the 
construction industry as a whole.
As so aptly pointed out in the Guide to 
Best ‘Fair Payment’ Practices, published by 
the UK Office of Government Commerce in 
July 2007:
“ P o o r p a y m e n t p r a c t i c e s i n t h e 
construction industry give rise to substantial 
additional financing and transaction costs. 
More importantly certainty over how 
much and when payment is made builds 
trust between supply team members and 
underpins collaborative working to achieve 
value for money projects for clients.”
Security of payment is fundamental to 
developing a healthy, professional and 
competitive construction industry. Here, 
security of payment is a term used by 
the building and construction industry to 
describe the need for secure, long–
term guaranteed arrangements 
f o r paymen t s f o r work 
performed or materials 
supplied.
Mechanisms for security of payment – an Overview
To achieve security of payment, legislation 
has been enacted to deal with payment-
related issues in construction contracts in 
many jurisdictions outside Hong Kong. Some 
other jurisdictions have adopted industrial 
or administrative measures to help provide 
security of payment in the construction 
industry.
Administrative Measures
A recent example of such administrative 
measure is provided by Mainland China via 
the introduction of payment bonds and other 
types of bonds in construction contracts, 
testing these as pilot schemes in several cities. 
Another example is Sri Lanka, where the use 
of bid bonds, performance bonds, advance 
payment bonds and maintenance bonds 
are quite common and there is a scheme 
established by the Sri Lanka government 
called ‘Construction Guarantee Fund’ which 
enables domestic contractors to obtain bonds 
and guarantees at concessionary terms.
Legislative Measures
The first of the security of payment legislation 
is the UK Housing Grants, Construction and 
Regeneration Act 19966. Other examples 
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include the Building and Construction 
Industry Security of Payment Act of 1999 in 
New South Wales, of 2002 in Victoria, of 
Queensland in 2004, and the Construction 
Contracts Act 2004 in Western Australia; 
the Construction Contracts Act 2002 in New 
Zealand; and of Building and Construction 
Industry Security of Payment Act 2004 in 
Singapore. In Malaysia, a legislative 
move towards the enactment 
of the Construction Industry 
Payment and Adjudication 
Act 2007 is also being finalised. 
These legislation generally enable 
progress claims for payments in construction 
contracts even if the contract itself is silent 
on it7, and commonly contain provisions 
for prompt adjudication of disputes over 
progress payments, allowing suspension of 
works for non-payment or failure to provide 
security after adjudication, and illegalising 
or outlawing conditional payment provisions 
in construction contracts. These legislative 
measures are intended partly to ensure that 
money flows down the contracting chain by 
banning pay if paid/pay when paid clauses. 
These clauses allow the contractor to a 
contract to avoid paying for work done under 
the contract simply because the contractor 
has not yet been paid under a separate 
contract. In many ways, such provisions 
essentially defeat the privity of contracts and 
stop sub-contractors from getting money to 
which they are legitimately entitled for works 
they have done competently and to the 
best of their abilities. There is good reason 
for support for the protection of the sub-
contractors who have actually executed the 
works by banning these conditional payment 
clauses in various jurisdictions, as explained 
in the explanatory memorandum to the 
Western Australia Construction Contracts Bill 
2004.
Way Forward for Hong Kong
In Hong Kong, the CIRC report recommended 
that “…further consideration should be given 
to the merits of, and the need for, enacting 
security of payment legislation having regard 
to local circumstances and in the light of 
overseas experience”8. Following this, there 
was a pilot implementation of voluntary 
adjudication and dispute resolution adviser 
system in a number of designated government 
projects. Whilst the merits of such legislation 
overseas were acknowledged, relying on 
the experience of such pilot schemes, it was 
remarked in 2005, at least for the public 
sector projects, that security of payment 
legislation is unnecessary under local 
circumstances for the moment9. Instead of 
adopting security of payment legislation 
generally, it was reported that other measures 
for dealing with the dubious practices in 
the private sector, such as promulgation of 
guidelines on security of payment and setting 
up of trust accounts for payment to sub-
contractors, could be considered. The newly 
formed Construction Industry Council is 
expected to further deliberate on the subject 
of security of payment accordingly.
Those who are in support of some form of 
security of payment legislation for Hong Kong 
have reservations as to the effectiveness of 
the mere use of such administrative measures 
in easing cashflow difficulty. For example, 
promulgation of guidelines on security of 
payment does not have the same mandatory 
effect on the parties; the setting up of trust 
accounts for payment to sub-contractors may 
be of more relevance to payment problems 
that are resulted from insolvency. As for the 
use of voluntary adjudication, a party to a 
voluntary adjudication may always refuse to 
have adjudication; the adjudication process 
itself, being quite similar to a mini-arbitration, 
can indeed take a long time. It is further 
recognized that some modifications may 
be required when adopting such overseas 
legislation to suit the local conditions. On the 
other hand, those in support are of the view 
that such legislation, even in a limited form, 
can be of benefits, not limited to contractors 
and sub-contractors, but rather to the whole 
of the Hong Kong construction industry.
It is nonetheless worth noting that the 
security of payment legislation overseas 
have been in a stage of review based on 
their respective operation experience. Other 
measures introduced or in use for securing 
5  CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY REVIEW COMMITTEE, Construct for Excellence: Report of the Construction 
Industry Review Committee, para.5.77, Hong Kong, 2001.
6  Construction Contracts (Northern Ireland) Order 1997 , Construction Contracts Exclusion Order (Northern 
Ireland) 1999, and Scheme for Construction Contracts (England and Wales) Regulations 1998, United Kingdom.
7  Sections 109 and 110 of the UK Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996, United Kingdom.
8  Hong Kong CIRC Report, para.5.80, 2001.
9  Environment, Transport and Works Bureau, briefing paper to the Legislative Council, titled “Overall Review Of 
Implementation of Construction Industry Review Committee Recommendations”, Hong Kong, April 2007.
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payment in some jurisdictions are also the 
subject of experiments and study. Examples 
of these include the consultation paper 
titled Improving payment practices in the 
construction industry: 2nd consultation on 
proposals to amend part II of the Housing 
Grants Construction and Regeneration Act 
1996 and the Scheme for Construction 
Contracts (England and Wales) Regulation 
1998 published in June 2007 by the UK 
Department of Trade and Industry; and 
the discussion paper titled Security of 
Payments in the Building and Construction 
Industry in October 2002 published by the 
Royal Commission into the Building and 
Construction Industry in Australia. These 
all provide Hong Kong with excellent 
insight and real-life guidance on the 
practicability and effectiveness 
o f  t h e s e l e g i s l a t i o n 
a n d  m e a s u r e s , 
al lowing the 
construction industry to explore whether and 
if so how to adopt or adapt them for use in 
Hong Kong.
The way forward is still a matter yet to be 
seen. In the premises, an outline and reviews 
of the choices available and suggestions for 
enhancing security of payment are provided 
below, with a view to providing an agenda 
for discussions of their respective pros and 
cons, practicability, limitations and 
ease of implementation and 
enforcement for use in 
t h e  H o n g  K o n g 
cons t ruc t ion 
industry.
Getting the contract right
Before venturing into discussing possible 
legislation or other administrative measures, 
it is always important not to lose sight of 
the vital starting point – the contract itself. 
Without a clear contractual framework, 
legislative or administrative measures to 
enhance security of payment, whether from 
the perspective of timelines or quantum, may 
be of little utility. This is true for contractors 
and sub-contractors; this is likewise true for 
construction workers.
Written Contracts
It is well-known that many sub-contractors 
in Hong Kong, especially those at the lower 
tiers in a multi-layered sub-contracting chain, 
do not enter into formal subcontracts with 
the main or upper-tier contractors10. The 
contract may only be partly written; it may 
engage uncertain arrangement like ‘back-
to-back’11 without specific definition being 
given; it may even be made wholly orally. 
Apart from project requirements, other 
matters such as rules for measurement and 
methods of valuation of variations are often 
not discussed let alone documented. This 
practice poses difficulty for certainty of the 
payment amount, let alone prompt payment. 
In many cases, apart from disputing over 
performance or valuation of work, parties 
argued on the existence or wording of a 
term12, or even who is the actual contracting 
party13. The matters are further complicated 
by the possible deductions by way of set-
off under the same contract, across contracts 
or at common law14; by the incorporation 
of ‘pay-when/i f-paid’ arrangement in 
subcontracts15; and by the incorporation of 
arbitration clauses of the upper-tier contracts 
into subcontracts16.
The need for a written contract is stressed 
in paragraph 2.2 of the Guidelines on 
Subcontracting Practice, which is published 
in March 2003 by the Hong Kong PCICB 
in response to the recommendat ion 
made by the Hong Kong CIRC aiming to 
raise the performance standards of sub-
contractors by providing them with a 
conducive environment to develop more 
effective collaboration and achieve better 
built quality, where it states that “[s]
ubcontracts executed at all layers should 
be made on written documents for the sake 
of better transparency and more effective 
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safeguard of legal rights and obligations”. 
The Guidelines call for the clear definition 
of the method to ascertain interim and final 
payments under subcontracts. To achieve 
this, it is recommended that there should be 
provisions in subcontracts to cater for fair 
and timely payments for the amount of works 
completed; clear and equitable arrangements 
on deduction of payments that set out the 
grounds on which deductions may be made 
from payments due to sub-contractors; 
identification, valuation and payment for 
variations to sub-contract works; early 
settlement of final account; the rights of sub-
contractor in case of non-payment or late 
payment, such as suspended execution of 
works and referral to adjudication, mediation 
and arbitration; the contractual entitlement 
of sub-contractors to recover reasonable 
interest on delayed payment; commitment by 
sub-contractors to make timely payment of 
wages to their workers and sub-contractors 
in lower tiers, as well as actions that could 
be taken against failure to do so; and 
percentages of payment to be deducted as 
retention money, which should be released 
fully upon fulfillment of obligations under the 
subcontracts17.
The Guidelines on Standard Forms of 
Domestic Subcontracts for Basic Trades 
published by the Provisional Construction 
Industry Co-ordination Board in May 2005 
which incorporates these provisions can 
be a useful model to be adopted to provide 
the essential contractual framework for 
payments.
I t i s noteworthy that , in some 
jurisdictions, statutory regulations 
as to the content of contracts 
a r e  n o t  u n c o m m o n , 
particularly where in deserving 
circumstances such as protection of 
consumers. This is notwithstanding that 
party autonomy to contracts have long 
been respected in various common law 
jurisdictions. An example, not directly 
related to security of payment, can be found 
in New South Wales. The New South Wales 
Home Building Act 1989 calls for certain 
compulsory content for home building 
contracts between home owners and 
builders. The New South Wales Office of Fair 
Trading has produced a contract checklist of 
12 questions in total to help home owners to 
decide whether they are ready to enter into 
such contracts18. The focus of its operation is 
obviously to protect home owners who deal 
with builders as consumers. Hence, it seems 
that, where the circumstances so justified, 
statutory intervention to assist parties as 
regards the proper content on certain 
aspects of a contract, such as payment, is an 
option on top of merely issuing guidance on 
industry best practice. Of course, any form 
of legislative intervention has to be balanced 
against the well-recognised and respected 
principle in a free market of party autonomy 
in contracts. If the imbalance of negotiating 
power or abuse of dominant position is such 
that the industry should no longer tolerate, 
legislative intervention may well be the only 
recourse.
Payments to Contractors/
Sub-Contractors
In other industries, there are various 
commercial devices commonly adopted 
to help securing payments. Examples of 
these include the use of parent company 
guarantees or collateral warranties, or the 
adoption of counterparty risk assessment 
practice. The real question is whether such 
devices can be usefully applied in Hong 
Kong to secure payment from the employer 
or upper-tier contractors.
To achieve fair and prompt payment, 
a number of measures have been utilized 
in jurisdictions outside Hong Kong. The 
discussions here will focus only on those 
that are more likely to be of utility in Hong 
Kong and is not intended to be an exhaustive 
examination of all available forms of security 
of payment measures. As regards contractors 
10  Hong Kong CIRC Report, para.4.22, 2001.
11  Honeywell Ltd. v. Kin Ming E & M Works Ltd. & Another [2004] HKEC 521.
12  Brilliant (Man Sau) Engineering Ltd. v Prosperity Construction and Decoration Ltd. [2006] HKEC 1244.
13  Onway Engineering Ltd. v. Chinney Construction Co Ltd. [2005] HKEC 1880.
14  Chow Kee t/a Tapbo Civil Engineering Co v. Transway Construction & Engineering Ltd. [2006] HKEC 2314.
15  Yee Hing Electricity & Watering Construction Co Ltd. v. Ng Hok Tai [2006] HKEC 1125.
16  WH-SCG JV Ltd. v. Hong Kong Construction (Holdings) Ltd. [2006] HKEC 1492.
17  PROVISIONAL CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY CO-ORDINATION BOARD, Guidelines on Subcontracting 
Practice, para.2.9, Hong Kong, 2003.
18  NSW OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, Report on the Outcome of the Review of the Home Building Act 1989, 2005, 
New South Wales, Australia.
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and sub-contractors, these include the 
introduction of payment bonds and the 
enhanced use of escrow account for retention 
money. They have been devised to ensure 
works done would be paid for. Another 
aspect is to ensure prompt payment by 
reinforcing certainty in interim payments so 
as to maintain cashflow. As illustrated below, 
for these to be effective, an initiative and a 
top-down arrangement from the employers is 
called for19.
Certainty of Available Fund to Honour 
Payment Obligations
Payment Bond
In the context of the construction industry, 
a payment bond is an agreement by a surety 
towards a contractor that the surety will pay 
to the contractor the amount of works done 
under the construction contract, up to the 
bonded amount or a percentage of the price 
of the works done, in case the employer 
defaults in its payment obligations. The 
surety, who is usually a bank or insurance 
company, agrees to provide such a bond in 
return for a premium paid to it. A payment 
bond is similar in nature to a performance 
bond, which is to be provided by a 
contractor, but it secures payment obligations 
by the employer rather than performance 
obligations by the contractor under the 
contract. A payment bond can be used to 
secure payments from a contractor to its sub-
contractors or suppliers. Likewise, a payment 
bond can also be utilized to secure payment 
from the employer to the contractor.
United States and Canada (payment bond 
procured by the Contractor)
This is commonly used in private projects 
in the United States (34 states) and Canada 
where a contractor is required under the 
contract with the employer to provide 
a payment bond to secure its payment 
obligations towards its sub-contractors and 
suppliers. The rationale for that is to enable 
the project to be free from the mechanics 
lien (a feature provided by mechanics’ lien 
legislation in Maryland, United States starting 
from 1791) that the unpaid sub-contractors 
or suppliers may otherwise assert over the 
project. In other words, a payment bond 
has the effect of protecting the employer 
against the possible financial loss caused 
by mechanics’ lien. For public projects, 
mandatory payment bonds are used to 
protect sub-contractors and suppliers. These 
legislations are often referred to as the Miller 
Act and the Little Miller Acts. An overview 
for these can be seen at the final report titled 
Builders’ Liens in Nova Scotia: Reform of the 
Mechanics’ Lien Act in June 2003 by the Law 
Reform Commission of Nova Scotia and the 
California Law Revision Commission.
The question may arise as to whether lien 
legislation should be introduced in Hong 
Kong. Mechanics’ lien legislations are not 
found in common law jurisdictions such as 
United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, 
Singapore and Hong Kong. The reasons 
why these legislation were introduced to 
United States and Canada may be of historic 
or academic interests. It is submitted that 
mechanics’ lien legislation is probably 
more a result of legislative public policy to 
protect the contractors and its lower-tiers 
sub-contractors and suppliers, resulted from 
historical development in the United States. 
Nonetheless, from the practical perspectives, 
the experiences for using them are not all 
positive either. So far as ensuring cashflow 
down the project is concerned, the statutory 
lien remedy has become disproportionately 
expensive and complex to enforce; the lien 
legislation in the United States does not 
really address issues of time of 
payment and disputes over 
performance of contracts; 
more importantly mechanics’ 
lien are enforced exclusively through 
judicial foreclosure sales of the property, 
which is a very drastic move for those at 
the lower-tiers and of immense significance 
to the property owner who may be entirely 
faultless. It is a draconian measure only to be 
used if all else fail.
The use of payment bonds is nonetheless 
not free from complications. The bond is 
furnished to the employer, but the employer 
has no right to file a claim under the bond 
nor to call the bond. The beneficiaries are 
typically all the lower-tier sub-contractors 
and suppliers. Hence the sub-contractors and 
suppliers have to rely on the assistance from 
the employer in securing a copy of the bond 
in other to file a claim under it. Whilst it is 
in the employer’s interest to know whether 
and how much has been claimed under 
the bond, that tends to get the employer 
involved in the payment disputes between 
the contractor and sub-contractors. The other 
inevitable commercial implication is that the 
need for a bond would certainly be reflected 
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in the tender price to be shouldered by the 
employer at the end of the day.
Mainland China (payment bonds  
procured by employer)
Another recent experience in using payment 
bonds to secure payment to contractors 
can be found in Mainland China. A report 
on the implementation of Construction 
Law submitted to the f i f th session of 
the tenth National People's Congress 
Standing Committee in 2003 indicated that 
investors of construction projects across 
Mainland China owed a total RMB336.5 
billion (USD40.69 billion) to construction 
companies by 2002. Some 39.6% of the 
money in arrears took place in real 
estate development projects 
and 26.7% in government-
funded construction projects. 
I t was fu r the r r epor t ed tha t 
late payment for construction had 
become prevalent in the industry and was 
worsening. An overview of these problems 
can be found in various documents, such 
as the Notice of the General Office of State 
Council Office on Resolving Payment Delay 
and Default Problems in the Construction 
Sector in November 2003 and the Notice of 
General Office of State on Forwarding the 
Opinions of Ministry of Construction and 
Other Departments on Further Resolving 
Payment Delay and Default Problems in 
the Construction Sector in October 2004. 
Following the determination from the 
Central Government to resolve payment 
problems, the State Council introduced 
various measures to change the procurement 
practice in the construction industry and to 
overcome difficulties in getting paid. One of 
these measures is the use of payment bonds 
to be procured by the employer.
As early as the Notice of the General 
Office of State Council Office on Resolving 
Payment Delay and Default Problems in the 
Construction Sector, issued in November 
2003, the use of payment bonds from 
employers was being advocated as part of the 
risk management measures to avoid payment 
problems from the very top. Since then, the 
use of payment bonds in Mainland China 
started developing rapidly.
In August 2004, the PRC Ministry of 
Construction issued the Several Provisions 
on Implementing Construction Contract 
Guarantee in Real Estate Development 
Projects (For Trial Implementation). Chapter 
2 requires payment bond to be issued by 
the employer in favour of the contractor 
in every construction contract for real 
estate developments where the contract 
pr ice exceeds RMB10 mil l ion20. The 
payment bond can be given in the form of a 
guarantee by a bank or a professional surety 
company at the time when entering into the 
construction contract. The amount of the 
bonded sum should be the same as that of 
the performance bond that the contractor 
is required to provide to the employer, and 
should be within the range of 10% to 15% 
of the contract price. The payment bond 
and the contract have to be submitted to the 
relevant construction authority for record. 
In 2005, several cities, namely Shenzhen, 
Xiamen, Qingdao, Chengdu, Hangzhou, 
Changzhou and Tianjin were chosen as 
pilot cities for the implementation of the use 
payment bonds. Samples of such payment 
bond were also prepared and published in 
May 2005. Other cities and provinces, such 
as Beijing, Chongqing and Jiangsu, also 
issued their own regulations and measures 
for implementing the use of bonds in local 
contraction contracts. As an illustration, in 
the case of Zhuhai, use of bonds is required 
for construction contracts with a price over 
RMB2 millions.
Studies on the experience of these pilot 
and pioneer cities all reported positively 
on the use of payment bonds in helping 
to reduce the payment problems21. After 
a review of the experience, in December 
2006, the Ministry of Construction issued the 
Notice on Opinion on Further Implementing 
Construction Contract Guarantee in Real 
Estate Development Projects, affirming 
the benefits of the use of payment bonds 
and extending its use to other pilot cities. 
It also sets out a target for establishing the 
systems for proper legal regulation, credit 
management, risk management and industrial 
regulation by 2010 in relation to the use of 
bonds in the construction industry.
19  Hong Kong CIRC Report, para.2.11, 2001.
20  MINISTRY OF CONSTRUCTION, Several Provisions on Implementing Construction Contract Guarantee in Real 
Estate Development Projects (For Trial Implementation), article 2, PRC, 2004.
21  Deng X.M. and WANG C.Y., Analysis of Tested Effects and Future Development of Employer Payment Bond 
System, Construction Economy, Vol. 289, pp.5-8, 2006.
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Hong Kong
For Hong Kong, there are good reasons for 
engaging the use of payment bond to secure 
payment from an employer to the contractor 
and, likewise from a contractor to its sub-
contractors. Unlike other jurisdictions 
with builders’ lien legislation, there is no 
lien at common law of a contractor for the 
works it has carried out over the project 
land, building or structure. As noted above, 
a lien is a charge, or claim, which one 
person has upon the property of another as 
security for the payment of a debt. Builders’ 
lien legislations would grant people who 
have performed work, provided services, 
or furnished materials in relation to land, 
buildings or other structures with a lien 
upon the real property improved by the lien 
holders’ efforts. However the draconian 
effect of such legislation should be carefully 
analysed before embarking on it. If the use 
of payment bonds can address the problem 
of securing available funds for payment, lien 
legislations should probably be avoided.
In Hong Kong it is not uncommon for a 
construction contract of billions of dollars 
in value to be entered into between the 
contractor and the ‘employer’, which is a 
mere two-dollar shell company packaged as 
a management company but actually owning 
no assets at all other than the two $1 shares. 
This phantom ‘employer’ is often an affiliate/
associated company of the land owner 
operating as a project management company 
set up by the land owner. In such a case, 
the true ‘employer’ can take the benefits of 
the corporate veil and can avoid liability 
towards the contractor for any payments due. 
After substantial completion of the work, 
the incentives for settling the outstanding 
claims by or payments due and owing to the 
contractor may not be there. The phantom 
‘employer’ being one without any significant 
assets may become expendable after the 
completion of the work.
From another perspective construction 
projects typically involve a pyramid-
like structure of independent contracts, 
with the employer at the top and at the 
bottom the construction workers. Given the 
number of contractual relationships that 
a construction project typically involves, 
the failure of any one of the parties along 
the chain can negatively affect those lower 
in the construction pyramid. Furthermore, 
generally, payments are made as the works 
progress and some form of advance capital 
funding for the works for a period prior to 
getting paid is inevitable. Hence, akin to a 
letter of credit in sale of goods contracts, a 
guarantee that there are funds for paying the 
works done and materials supplied is not 
unreasonable. If no payment is forthcoming 
from the top, all in the construction pyramid 
would suffer. This puts the contractor in 
difficulties since, while not getting paid, 
it has incurred liabilities towards its sub-
contractors, suppliers and workers.
It seems from the experience of Mainland 
China that the use of payment bond is 
helpful. It also seems to be a fair practice 
as construction contracts in Hong Kong 
do usually require the provision of a 
performance bond from a surety procured 
by the contractor for the benefits of the 
employer. A payment bond procured by the 
payer as security for its payment obligations 
is just a reciprocity arrangement.
To minimize the commercial impact 
on the party procuring the bond, it can be 
a revolving bond for interim payments. If 
complemented with immediate dispute 
resolution mechanisms on interim payments, 
the employer or upper-tier contractor would 
not be able to evade payments even without 
the need of legislative measures to enforce 
decisions. It can also be used together with 
milestone payment arrangements. This is 
dealt with further below.
Parent Company Guarantee
Parent company guarantees are 
often required as a condition 
to submitting tender if the 
contractor is a subsidiary or 
joint-venture company of a large 
group of companies and there is evidence 
and hence confidence in the financial 
viabili ty of the parent company. The 
exact scope of protection provided would 
obviously depend on the wordings used but, 
in general, the effects of such guarantees, like 
performance bonds, are to provide security 
or indemnity to employers in relation to the 
due performance by contractors.
The use for parent company guarantee, 
from a ‘phantom’ employer (as discussed 
above) to a contractor, may only be of 
used if it has the same ease of enforcement 
and security as a payment bond where the 
surety is usually an independent third party. 
Nonetheless, if appropriately worded, a 
Forum      29
parent company guarantee may be utilised to 
secure payment. This may be more amenable 
to the employer as it does not “cost” them 
anything if its subsidiaries comply with its 
contractual obligations.
Others
Collateral warranties are regularly used to 
deal with the absence of contractual links 
among the numerous parties involved 
in construction projects, for example 
by rendering the contractor liable to the 
employer for design services provided by 
sub-contractors; the beneficiaries under 
such warranties are normally not the sub-
contractors or workers down the line. 
Similarly, other devices such as advance 
payment guarantees to secure the advance 
payment effected to the contractor to meet 
its mobilization or initial costs are typically 
engaged in international contracts to protect 
the employer against the failure of the 
contractors but not vice versa.
The use of counterparty risk 
assessment in the financial or 
commodity trading sectors has 
proved to be successful in varying 
extent. The process of counterparty risk 
assessment is a combination of professional 
good practices for due diligence investigation, 
for instance, by checking matters like track 
records, reputation in market, financial 
statements, credit status, etc.. Nonetheless, in 
the construction industry, such due diligence 
investigation may not always turn out to be 
effective to deal with payment problems due 
to the inherent performance complications 
and legal uncertainties involved in the 
execution of construction works. The fact 
that the counterparty does not pay may have 
nothing to do with its financial viability. More 
importantly, this is unlikely to be viable in the 
Hong Kong situation at this date and time.
Escrow Account for Retention
The practice of retention is widespread 
among various common law jurisdictions, 
including Hong Kong. In many standard 
forms of construction contracts in Hong 
Kong, the payer (employer or upper-tier 
contractor) is permitted to retain a stipulated 
percentage of the progress payments that 
have become due, up to a ceiling amount. 
These are to be released in tranches, usually 
at substantial completion and at expiration of 
defects liability period/certificate of making 
good defects. Standard forms of contract 
usually require the employer to hold such 
retention on trust for the contractor, primarily 
as security for completion and rectification of 
works. A good analysis of retention moneys 
is provided in the guidance titled Retentions: 
Striking out Cash Retentions published in 
September 2007 by the National Specialist 
Contractors Council in UK as part of the 
Fair Payment Campaign. Similar retention 
arrangement is also in place between the 
contractor and nominated sub-contractors.
Under most standard forms of contracts, 
the employer is deemed to be holding the 
retention money in a fiduciary capacity as 
a trustee for the contractor. Hence, in such 
situations, the contractor is entitled as a 
matter of law to request the employer to pay 
the present and future retention money into 
a separate trust account, for the benefit of 
the contractor. This is illustrated in the case 
of Concorde Construction Co Ltd. v. Colgan 
Co Ltd.22, where a mandatory injunction was 
granted directing the employer to do so. The 
advantages of this injunction are obvious. The 
primary purpose is to offer some protection 
to the contractor in case of insolvency of the 
employer or breach of trust by the employer 
in wrongfully dissipating such sums against 
the interest of the beneficiary.
It should be noted that there can be no 
trust created unless the trust property is 
identified, and hence no trust is created if 
the retention money is left mixed with the 
employer’s and the upper-tier contractor’s 
own money. Nevertheless, there is usually 
no provision in the standard construction 
contracts in Hong Kong setting out how this 
contractual obligation is to be implemented 
by the employer or upper-tier contractor. The 
contract is silent as to where the retention 
should be held or by whom. Even if the 
retention is kept in a separate trust account, it 
is normally in the sole name of the employer 
or upper-tier contractor. In the end, the 
deemed trust may just be not much more 
than one of academic interest.
Other problems such as delayed release 
of the retention and lost of retention in 
situations like insolvency of the employer or 
upper-tier contractor are not unheard of. The 
22  [1984] HKC 241 and Hsin Chong Construction Co Ltd. v. Yaton Realty Co Ltd. (1984) 29 BLR 120.
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recent unfortunate incident regarding a main 
contractor engaged in public works casts 
light on how these problems can evolve.
Study by the Queensland Building 
Services Authority has noted that reviews in 
New South Wales, Queensland and Western 
Australia have all recommended against 
such ‘deemed’ trusts because of serious legal 
shortcomings, a likely increase in the cost of 
building projects, failure to guarantee sub-
contractors will be paid, lack of industry 
support and high administrative costs.
In contrast, in some other jurisdictions, 
such as France and New Mexico, there are 
legislation requiring that all retention moneys 
to be held in a separate escrow account. 
‘Escrow’ is a legal term which means money, 
goods or a written document, held by a 
trusted independent third party, i.e. the 
escrow agent, pending the fulfillment of some 
condition (such as certification of practical 
completion or making good defects in the 
construction industry). A separate agreement 
is entered into with the escrow agent and 
the agreement to create the escrow account 
is often included as a term to the underlying 
contract between the parties.
As highl ighted in the paper t i t led 
Retentions: Striking out Cash Retentions 
published by the UK National Specialist 
Contractors Council in September 2007, 
most of the construction work, as least in 
the building services trades, is carried out by 
sub-contractors. Hence, a substantial portion 
of the retention held by the employer does 
not actually belong to the main contractor; it 
belongs to the sub-contractors that have built 
the job for the employer. This observation 
is equally true in Hong Kong. Some form of 
protection against lost of retention due to the 
specific circumstances of the main contractor 
should be provided.
However, it may be said that ‘striking out 
retention’ may be too drastic and may expose 
the employer or the upper-tier contractor to 
risks too great to bear. A means based on the 
current arrangements but striving to balance 
the interests of all the parties may be more 
acceptable.
The use of escrow account for retention 
money in the construction industry may have 
to include several features for it to become 
an effective solution. The retention money, 
instead of left mixed with the other funds of 
the employer, should be truly put in trust. 
This can be stipulated in the construction 
contract between the parties. The retention 
money will be automatically deposited into 
the stipulated escrow account. There can be 
various neutral third persons fit to act as the 
escrow agent. The usual escrow agents are 
banks or insurance companies. But in Hong 
Kong, the Construction Industry Council is 
probably best placed to provide such services 
at a small fee. Retention moneys from 
different projects between different parties 
will be put into separate escrow accounts 
managed by the Cons t ruct ion 
Industry Council, in return 
for a small administrative 
charge. The amount of the 
administrative charge may in whole 
or in part be off-set by the corresponding 
interest earned from the deposits. The payer 
is responsible for paying in the retention 
into the escrow account under Construction 
Industry Council. The payer and/or the 
Construction Industry Council shall then 
send a notice of a payment-in to the 
beneficiary. If necessary, provisions can be 
made for the payer or the beneficiary payee 
to check the status of the escrow account 
with the Construction Industry Council. 
When properly operated, this arrangement 
creates a win-win-win situation for all and 
can be implemented within the contractual 
framework with only a minor modification.
Certainty of Interim Payment
It is widely recognised that poor payment 
practices in the construction industry give 
rise to substantial additional financing and 
transaction costs. It is therefore crucial to 
have certainty over how much and when 
payment is to be made. Such a theme is 
stressed in paragraph 2.8 of the Guidelines 
on Subcontracting Practice in Hong Kong 
and also paragraph 1 of the Guide to Best 
‘Fair Payment’ Practices of the Office of 
Government Commerce in UK. Terms for 
achieving certainty of payment and timely 
valuation are good practices to be adopted.
Transparency in interim payment process 
(especially in Nominated sub-contracts 
arrangements)
As a matter of fairness, there should be 
transparency in the interim payment process. 
Relevant information on each interim 
payment application and certification as 
well as payment times should be made 
available to the sub-contractors. This will 
help develop certainty, confidence and trust 
within the construction pyramid ultimately 
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for the benefit of the employer. This is 
important in the context of nominated sub-
contractors’ payments which have to be 
by way of certification of the employer’s 
engineer or architect. This is equally, if not 
more, important in the context of domestic 
sub-contractors. They ought to be aware of 
the quantity/stage of works the contractor 
submits as having been completed thereby 
entitling them to interim payment, and what 
ultimately the employer has certified. There 
is no proper or justifiable reason why this 
should not be followed. One that has been 
proffered was commercial secret. Taken 
to its highest, it may justify redaction of 
information not relevant to the particular 
nominated or domestic sub-contractor. 
For nominated sub-contractors, the rates 
are often known to all. For domestic sub-
contractors, the relevant information needed 
is just the quantity/stage of works certified 
as having been completed. In any event, 
viewing the ground of commercial 
secret objectively and reasonably, 
it should not be sufficient to 
undermine the principles of 
fairness and transparency. After 
all, this mechanism is only focusing on 
interim payments, and would not affect the 
ultimate acceptance of the works.
Reasons for withholding of payment to 
be expressed/clear timelines for assessing 
interim payments
Apart f rom transparency, the interim 
payment amount should fairly represent 
the works properly carried out or materials 
supplied, in accordance with the contract, 
and there should not be any unsubstantiated 
or disproportionate withholding of payment 
or refusal to value variations.
Contractual provis ions to achieve 
certainty of payment are equally important 
in Hong Kong and in jurisdictions with 
security of payment legislation. Indeed, in 
those jurisdictions, a series of provisions23 
(in different levels of details) governing the 
dates on which payments become due and 
procedures for obtaining such payments are 
provided for. As observed in Sir Michael 
Latham’s Review of Part II of the Housing 
Grants Construction and Regeneration Act 
1996 in 2004, even with provisions ensuring 
security of payment, the problem of lack 
of certainty of payment still required to 
be addressed by, for example, modifying 
section 110(1) of the 1996 Act to ensure 
that the amount of payment is crystallised 
between the parties before the payment 
date. Certainty of payment is of particular 
importance in contracts where there is no 
certification by a neutral person, like an 
engineer or architect. In such situations, the 
payment framework can fail to create a clear 
understanding between the parties as to what 
is the sum due. The importance of this is also 
observed in chapter 2 of the UK consultation 
paper titled Improving Payment Practices in 
the Construction Industry: 2nd Consultation 
on Proposals to Amend Part II of the Housing 
Grants Construction and Regeneration Act 
1996 and the Scheme for Construction 
Contracts (England and Wales) Regulations 
1998 in June 2007.
The Hong Kong PCICB Guidelines on 
Subcontracting Practice, or its Guidelines On 
Standard Forms Of Domestic Subcontracts 
For Basic Trades published in May 2005 
or the UK Guide to Best ‘Fair Payment’ 
Practices provide useful guiding principles 
to be observed in entering into a contract 
with a view of getting enhanced certainty in 
payment. Appreciation, adoption and further 
promotion of these fundamental principles 
are needed for the betterment of the Hong 
Kong construction industry as a whole.
To give effect to these ideas, it is submitted 
that the immediate dispute resolution 
mechanisms must be in place to avoid abuse 
as well as to enable genuine differences 
between parties to be resolved avoiding 
entrenchment of views which tends to 
jeopardise working relationship.
Milestone Payment
The milestone payment approach24 effects 
interim payments with reference to the 
achievement of pre-determined progress 
milestones, such as completion of foundation 
or reaching, say, the 5/F. This approach helps 
23  Part II of Scheme for Construction Contracts (England and Wales) Regulations 1998, UK; sections 13 to 20 of 
Construction Contracts Act 2002, New Zealand; sections 5 to 12 of Building and Construction Industry Security 
of Payment Act 2004, Singapore; sections 8 to 16 of Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 
1999, New South Wales, sections 9 to 17 of Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 2002, 
Victoria, sections 12 to 20 of Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 2004, Queensland, 
Part II of Construction Contracts Act 2004, Western Australia, Australia.
24  Hong Kong CIRC Report, paras.5.74 to 5.75.
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to ensure that payment and works progress stay 
generally predictable and consistent, linking 
interim payment to the project programme. 
M i l e s t o n e p a y m e n t s a r e b a s e d o n 
concepts different from those conventional 
construction works contracts which require 
the taking of interim measurements as the 
basis to effect interim payments in order to 
reimburse the contractor for the value of 
works it carried out. The need to and hence 
dispute over measurement can be avoided. 
It also enables better planning and enhances 
predictability of cashflow for both the 
contractor and the employer at all stages of 
the project. Any undesirable use of ‘front-end 
loading’ of payments in tendering may be 
prevented by installed pricing restraints for 
the respective milestones.
Apart from providing improved certainty 
of project payments, the milestone payment 
approach also motivates the project team 
members to adopt a target cost contracting 
approach. Working together with provisions 
for retention moneys, the milestone payment 
approach can also reduce the need to argue 
about deductions withheld for defects. 
Variations have to be dealt with separately. 
A clearly defined procedure to deal with 
variations should be in place. Readiness 
to accept a variation is a variation and 
willingness to value and agree a price for it 
is fundamental. Such changes in the works 
can then be valued and its payment reflected 
in the relevant milestone payment.
In Hong Kong, the milestone payment 
approach has been adopted in some public 
projects for quite some time. These include 
the Hong Kong Mass Transit Railway 
Corporation (“MTRC”), the airport core 
programme contracts and a number of 
other major works contracts in the 
public sector.
Though the question 
on whether the 
milestone in 
i s s u e 
has been reached is still open to arguments, 
past experience in Hong Kong indicates 
that a detailed stipulation as to what 
constitutes the attainment of the milestone 
should not be necessary. In other words, 
the fewer words used the better. This gives 
flexibility for the parties involved to deal 
with the matters in a commercial manner, 
for the overall benefit of the project and 
all involved. Naturally, if not properly 
administered, the flexibility is also open for 
abuse. But with proper safeguards such as 
provision for immediate dispute resolution 
mechanism, the issue of whether a milestone 
is reached can be decided promptly 
avoiding delay of payment.
Hence, consideration should be given for 
wider use of milestone payments in Hong 
Kong. Indeed, this is so recommended 
in the Hong Kong CIRC report that “…
the Government and other major clients 
should consider the wider adoption of 
the milestone payments approach so as 
to motivate contractors to deliver better 
performance”. The greater use of well-
defined milestone payment mechanism 
to simplify the interim measurement and 
valuation process is also recommended in 
UK Guide to Best ‘Fair Payment’ Practices. 
It is considered that it will lead to greater 
certainty of payment, lower financing 
charges and reduced transaction costs. 
One may also add better working 
relationship and team-work 
leading to better quality 
project.
Statutory Adjudication
No available immediate dispute  
resolution mechanism
To give effect to certainty of interim payment, 
it is necessary to bring into place an efficient 
dispute resolution mechanism during the 
currency of the works. At the moment, 
most contracts still provide for arbitration 
after substantial completion of works whilst 
giving an option for the parties to mediate 
or adjudicate if both agree. Such contractual 
provisions are not conducive to security of 
payment. One party is perfectly entitled to 
refuse to mediate or adjudicate. Arbitration 
at the end is futile so far as maintaining 
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cashflow is concerned. An unpaid contractor 
or sub-contractor is left with little remedy 
save to continue to provide advance capital 
funding to complete the project for the 
recalcitrant employer or upper-tier contractor. 
The party who was unpaid by reason of the 
employer not honouring certificates may 
rely on the contractual termination clause, 
if any. But, since there is no general right 
at common law on a contractor to suspend 
or stop works even if interim payments are 
wrongfully withheld25, the party who was 
unpaid by reason of undercertification is 
without remedy that is of any utility, and 
has often resorted to measures exposing 
itself to the risks of breaching the contract or 
infringing the law by not paying the workers.
It is important therefore to totally revise 
the current arrangement of resolving 
d i spu tes a f te r comple t ion 
or alternatively to give the 
receiving party a statutory 
right to pursue its entitlement for 
the interim/progress payments at the 
material time. As this could not be achieved 
by contract, this may have to be by way of 
legislation.
Experience overseas
In jurisdictions with enacted legislation on 
security for payment, statutory adjudication 
is an essential element of the whole scheme. 
Experiences in these jurisdictions generally 
indicate that statutory adjudication is running 
without much dissatisfaction or complaints26 
and other jurisdiction is in the process 
of discussing whether to adopt statutory 
adjudication in the construction industry27.
Each piece of legislation contains slight 
25  See, for example, Lubenham Fidelities & Investment Co. Ltd. v. South Pembrokeshire District Council (1986) 33 
BLR 39.
26  KENNEDY, P. Progress of Statutory Adjudication as a Means of Resolving Disputes in Construction in United 
Kingdom, Journal of Professional Issues in Engineering Education and Practice, 2006, 132(3), pp.236-247.
27  GLAHOLT, D.W. The Adjudication Option: Time for Uniform Security of Payment Legislation in Canada, 2005 
at http://www.glaholt.com/news/Adjudication%20in%20Canada.pdf .
28  Section 104 of Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996, United Kingdom.
29  Sections 4 and 6 of Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999, New South Wales, 
sections 4 and 6 of Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Acts 2002, Victoria, sections 2 and 
9 and schedule 2 of Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 2004, Queensland, and section 
3 of Construction Contracts Act 2004, Western Australia, Australia.
30  Section 14 of Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999, New South Wales, Australia.
31  Sections 6 and 25 of Construction Contracts Act 2004, Western Australia, Australia.
32  Section 12 of Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 2004, Singapore.
33  Section 25 of Construction Contracts Act 2002, New Zealand.
34  See sections 5 and 6 of Construction Contracts Act 2002, New Zealand.
35  Scheme for Construction Contracts (England and Wales) Regulations 1998, para.7, United Kingdom; section 36 
of Construction Contracts Act 2002, New Zealand.
36  Section 17 of Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999, New South Wales, section 18 of Construction 
Industry Security of Payment Act 2002, Victoria, section 21 of Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 
2004, Queensland, section 26 of Construction Contracts Act 2004, Western Australia, Australia; section 13 of 
Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 2004, Singapore.
variations. There are differences, for instance, 
as to what can be referred to adjudication, 
how the adjudication process should proceed 
and conclude, and the enforcement and 
challenge procedures of a decision by the 
adjudicator.
In UK, a party to a construction contract, 
as defined by reference to ‘construction 
operations’28, has the right to refer a dispute 
arising under the contract for adjudication. In 
New South Wales, Queensland, Victoria and 
Western Australia, a party to a construction 
contract , as def ined by reference to 
‘construction work’29, may commence 
adjudication essentially when there is 
difference between the scheduled amount in 
a payment schedule, (which is required by 
the legislation to be served when a claim of 
payment is filed30), and the amount claimed 
in the payment amount claimed is not paid 
or paid in full31. In Singapore, the provisions 
are similar to those in Australia32. In New 
Zealand, the scheme resembles that in UK33 
but the meaning of construction contract is 
defined differently34.
As to the initiation of the adjudication 
process, the UK and New Zealand scheme 
requires the giving of a notice of adjudication 
and the actual acceptance of the reference 
to adjudication35; while the Australia 
and Singapore scheme only calls for an 
adjudication application to be made36. A 
time period is prescribed within which an 
adjudication application must be made in 
Australia and Singapore, but not in UK or 
New Zealand.
The p rov i s ions o f the secur i t y o f 
payment legislation of these jurisdictions 
also differ, inter alia, in relation to the 
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duration of the adjudication decision or 
determination37 or the range of powers 
available to the adjudicator38. In particular, 
there is a procedure for a claimant party in 
New Zealand to seek the approval of the 
adjudicator for the issue of a charging order 
in respect of a construction site owned by 
the respondent and, if the land owner of 
the construction site is also an associate of 
the respondent, the adjudicator may, upon 
request, also determine that that owner 
is jointly and severally liable with the 
respondent and may approve the issue of 
a charging order over the construction site 
owned by that owner39.
In New Zealand40 and Singapore41, there 
is also a review procedure for the decision or 
determination after the adjudication. In other 
jurisdictions, the challenge of the decision 
is brought to court. The judicial sentiments 
in various jurisdictions differ as to the extent 
of the need for strict compliance with due 
process or rules.
It should be noted that almost all of these 
security of payment legislation are now 
under review. These reviews however mainly 
aim at improving the operational efficiency 
of the respective legislation by drawing on 
the experience after implementation. In the 
review of the New South Wales legislation 
conducted in 200442, it was reported that: 
“Review feedback indicated that the Act is 
bringing parties together early in a dispute and 
in many cases the parties are then settling their 
dispute without having to rely on arbitration or 
court action. While the submissions generally 
supported the reforms introduced by the Act a 
number of themes were raised for consideration 
to improve its operation.” The areas for 
improvements identified are more on legislative 
refinement or clarification, rather than on 
policy objectives. Examples of these include 
clarifying and rationalising certain definitions 
and requirements under the legislation; 
clarifying and reassessing some exemptions 
and limitations currently provided under the 
legislation; introducing additional provisions 
voiding unacceptable contract terms, similar 
to the current pay-when-paid provisions; 
standardising adjudication application 
processes; providing for the withdrawal, 
grouping and referral of adjudication 
applications; providing adjudicators with 
more time to undertake determinations; 
enabling adjudicators to deem an adjudication 
application invalid; addressing issues arising 
from court challenges; addressing concerns 
relating to adjudication fees; and introducing 
minimum adjudicator qualifications. Hence, 
there is overall support for the Building and 
Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 
1999 in New South Wales, across all industry 
sectors and there continues to be widespread 
satisfaction with the Act.
Obviously, a more diversified approach to 
change can be expected to be forthcoming 
after further reviews are conducted and 
legislation are put into further practice.
What would be the right model, if at 
all, for Hong Kong is not an easy question 
to answer. However, to make statutory 
adjudication effective, there are several 
matters that need to be kept in mind.
Above all, for an adjudication scheme to 
be effective there must be certainty both as 
to the timing and amount of payment that 
a party is entitled to under a construction 
contract. This is in line with the universal 
principle of fairness that participants to 
contracts have the right to receive full 
payment for the works properly done 
within a reasonable time and without 
conditions, as advocated in, for example, 
See, for example, the Model “Fair Payment” 
Charter contained in the UK Guide to Best 
‘Fair Payment’ Practices. The common 
engagement of conditional payment clauses 
such as the pay-when/if-paid clauses in sub-
contracts runs contrary to the very purpose 
of introducing security of payment legislation 
so as to achieve certainty and then security 
of payment. Their existence can render 
the statutory adjudication system 
ineffective in operation. The 
lower-tier sub-contractors will 
not be able to benefit from the 
legislation if their contracts contain 
a conditional payment clause. The 
problems of unsecured and advance capital 
funding cannot be alleviated. For these and 
other reasons, conditional payment clauses 
are not acceptable or rendered illegal and 
unenforceable in the various security of 
payment legislations.
The situation of a pay-when/if-paid clause 
can feature in a traditional contracting setting, 
as well as in other project finance schemes 
like PFIs and PPPs. Under these schemes, 
pay-when-paid arrangements are commonly 
adopted. In the recent case of Midland 
Expressway Ltd v. Carillion Construction Ltd 
(No 2) 43, where an injunction was sought 
to restrain the adjudication proceedings, 
the Technology and Construction Court in 
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37  Paragraph 19 of Scheme for Construction Contracts (England and Wales) Regulations 1998, United Kingdom; 
section 46 of Construction Contracts Act 2002, New Zealand; section 16 of Building and Construction Industry 
Security of Payment Act 2004, Singapore; section 21 of Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment 
Act 1999, New South Wales, section 22 of Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 2002, 
Victoria, section 25 of Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 2004, Queensland, and 
section 31 of Construction Contracts Act 2004, Western Australia, Australia.
38  Paragraph 13 of Scheme for Construction Contracts (England and Wales) Regulations 1998, United Kingdom; 
section 42 of New Zealand Construction Contracts Act 2002, New Zealand; section 16 of Building and 
Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 2004, Singapore; section 21 of Building and Construction 
Industry Security of Payment Act 1999, New South Wales, section 22 of Building and Construction Industry 
Security of Payment Act 2002, Victoria, section 25 of Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment 
Act 2004, Queensland, and section 31 of Construction Contracts Act 2004, Western Australia, Australia.
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UK held, in relation to a PFI type project 
for the construction of the tie-ins between 
the M6 and the new M6 toll road in UK, 
that provisions in a construction contract 
that restricted a contractor's right to interim 
payments to a proportion of the entitlement 
of its employer could be unenforceable 
for the reason that such ‘pay-when-paid’ 
provisions would be contrary to the Housing 
Grants Construction and Regeneration Act 
1996. Since such provisions have been 
widely used in PFIs/PPPs projects, the 
implications of this decision are considerable 
and catch the industry by some surprise. 
This is coupled with the usual arrangement 
in various security of payment legislation 
that the parties cannot, generally speaking, 
contract out the such legislations.
In the chapter 2 o f the UK la tes t 
consultation paper on the subject44, as part of 
the proposal to create a clear understanding 
of the sum due under a construction contract, 
it goes even further to consider whether 
to restrict the use of the traditional 
pay-when-certified clauses 
in construction contracts. 
Traditionally, in many contracts, 
certification by a supervising architect 
or engineer of payments is a normal and 
effective method of confirming sums due 
under the main contract. However, there are 
some concerns about lack of clarity when a 
sub-contract uses the certification process 
under the main contract as part of its payment 
mechanism. One of the justifications for 
restricting this as suggested in the paper is 
that, usually, a sub-contractor has no way of 
knowing whether a main contract certificate 
has been issued, or its contents, or whether 
the contractor has grounds under the pay-
when-certified clause to withhold payment. 
The sentiment is a definitive move away from 
any form of conditional payment.
Adjudication, like all other dispute 
resolution processes, is liable to be abused. 
Hence, safeguards should be installed. 
In the various legislation providing for 
adjudication, the time frame is usually 
relatively very short for the respondent to 
consider the claim made and to prepare its 
response in the adjudication. This is one of 
the very characteristics of the adjudication 
process for a determination or decision to 
be made within a short period. Indeed that 
is necessary if one is dealing with disputes 
over interim or progress payments. For 
example, in Singapore, a determination of 
the adjudicator is to be made within just 
one week or two45. Therefore, unlike the 
claimant who has more time to prepare its 
claim, the respondent is faced with a much 
shorter period. Yet, the amount at stake, even 
during the interim period, can be substantial. 
The concern of the respondent (payer) can 
nonetheless be addressed by the right of it 
to seek to re-open the decision by way of 
arbitration. This is often proffered to explain 
why this rough justice approach works and is 
beneficial. More importantly, the respondent 
would be well-versed with the certificate it 
has just issued and should not too seriously 
prejudiced by the relatively short time-frame. 
However, if the claimant seeks to utilize 
and run the adjudication process as a final 
accounting exercise, then without safeguards, 
the adjudication process may be opened to 
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abuse by a strategically-minded claimant. 
The respondent may be deprived of a fair 
chance to properly defend the claim. Unlike 
interim payments, the final account process 
is usually triggered by the contractor putting 
in its draft final account for discussion. The 
respondent may genuinely need more time 
than the normally short statutory limits. If 
inadequate time is provided, it runs contrary 
to the spirit of fundamental fairness so far as 
the adjudication process is concerned.
One way to address this potent ial 
problem is to provide that final accounting 
exercise should not be covered by the 
legislative regime and the parties can move 
to arbitration. Alternatively, a different time 
frame should be used.
Payment to workers
When dealing with security of payment, one 
should not of course lose sight of the need 
of safeguards for the frontline construction 
workers, who are even more vulnerable than 
sub-contractors in many cases. They are at 
the foundation of the construction pyramid. 
They offer toil and sweat to the project before any 
payment is received even by the main contractor. 
Yet they are at the end of the ‘food chain’.
Manpower is surely the most valuable 
asset in the construction industry. In Hong 
Kong, there is the wide adoption of the daily 
wage system of employment. Such a system 
of employment leads to unique kinds of 
problems when a worker seeks to recover 
outstanding wages. For example, a worker 
may be working for different employers 
during different days of the weeks; there is 
typically no formal employment contract 
in writing; some workers are actually 
engaged independent contractors rather 
than employees, being paid on a piece-by-
piece basis for work done. Further, with such 
short-term and causal employment, it is not 
uncommon that wages paid to employees 
in statutory statement by contractors to the 
tax authorities are booked as expenditures 
rather than staff salaries. Hence, proving the 
fact of employment and the amount of wages 
outstanding is commonly the first matters in 
dispute at the Labour Tribunal.
Indeed, th is dai ly wage sys tem of 
employment is recognised as not being 
conducive to the development of a quality 
culture or talent retention and the industry 
has been urged to invest more in improving 
the quality of its workforce by providing a 
more stable employment for construction 
workers by widening the use of direct labour, 
starting with the core trades46. Employers can 
assist through the contractual requirements of 
contractors using direct labour, and demand 
to see that a fundamental core group of 
workers have been engaged.
It should be noted that in some other 
jurisdictions, payments to workers may be 
regulated with statutory interventions to 
secure payments to workers. The New South 
Wales Industrial Relations Act 199647, for 
example, sets out the minimum wage and 
employment entitlements via ‘industrial 
instruments’, which include awards and 
enterprise agreements approved by the 
authorities. Employers are to provide 
employees with pay slips and keep records in 
relation to the employees. Failure to observe 
such mandatory obligations can result in 
criminal sanctions.
This extent of statutory framework and 
protection is not in operation in Hong 
Kong at the moment. In terms of providing 
protection for unpaid workers, Part IXA of the 
Hong Kong Employment Ordinance (Cap.57) 
has merely imposed a liability for head or 
upper-tier contractors to pay for a maximum 
of 2-month wages of workers engaged by its 
lower-tier sub-contractors for carrying out 
construction works on their sites should their 
actual employer fail to pay. Recently, wage 
disputes and wage arrears still have given rise 
to much concern over the past years in the 
Hong Kong construction industry. Due to the 
lack of knowledge of the identity of the sub-
contractor who engaged the unpaid workers, 
the innocent main contractor often ends up 
‘picking up the bill’. There may be a need to 
review this legislation in the not too distant 
future, whether in lines with those adopted 
by the New South Wales Industrial Relations 
Act 1996 or otherwise. In the meantime, 
various measures to tackle the problems have 
been introduced.
The Construction Workers Registration 
Ordinance (Cap.583) is subsequently enacted. 
Its primary aim is to enhance the quality 
and skills of all construction site workers via 
assessment certification. However, it will also 
help combat employment of illegal workers 
and assist in resolving wage disputes between 
the contractors and the workers when coupled 
with the availability of site attendance records 
under the computerized smart card system 
and implementation of site entrance control 
measures48.
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Fo l lowing the pub l i ca t ion o f t he 
Guidelines on Subcontracting Practice in 
2003, the Hong Kong Government started 
implementing the use of the Subcontractor 
Management Plan in public work projects 
by the then Environment, Transport and 
Works Bureau in 2003, which can result 
in disciplinary actions to be taken against 
contractors who are in breach. Under 
the Subcontractor Management Plan, all 
contractors are required to submit with 
their tender, details of their sub-contracting 
arrangements and to update the plan quarterly 
during the contract. This is meant to serve as a 
management tool for enhanced transparency 
of the individual contractor’s sub-contracting 
arrangement and accountability.
The PCICB has established the Voluntary 
Sub-contractor Registration Scheme. Sub-
contractors who have failed to pay their 
workers may be disciplined or removed from 
the Registry. As a result, they may not be 
able to tender for jobs of major employers 
who all stipulate that only sub-contractors on 
the registry will be accepted.
By this registration scheme and coupled 
with the Sub-contractor Management Plan, 
it is hoped that the frequent offenders of the 
labour law will gradually be rehabilitated or 
expelled from the market.
In public housing projects, a package of 
measures has also been introduced to require 
contractors to secure payments for workers 
on future Hong Kong Housing Authority 
construction contracts, which takes effect for 
all new building tenders issued after 1 May 
200649. These new measures include the 
coupled use of electronic site access control, 
supplemented with workers’ attendance 
records for cross-referencing with employment 
records; requiring workers’ employment 
agreements and labour records for contractors 
and sub-contractors; implementing a wage 
payment monitoring system and records, with 
payment by auto-pay; and implementing 
a sub-contractor management plan where 
contractors must report all layers of sub-
contractors engaged on site.
With the introduction of auto-pay, 
situations of falsified allegation over self-
employment and fabricated wage slips, or 
wage receipts signed under duress should 
be reduced. Proper safeguards or monitoring 
through management measures by the main 
contractor are obviously required to ensure 
wages due were indeed paid on time and on 
a regular basis. Initiatives from the employers 
are crucial to help change the culture of the 
industry and ensure security of payment all 
the way to the wage payments to workers.
Conclusion
Cashflow is the lifeblood of the Hong 
Kong construction industry. It is particular 
important when the industry thrives on small 
sub-contractors providing labour without 
any advance payment. The experience and 
systems in many jurisdictions outside Hong 
Kong in relation to the use of legislative and 
other measures to enhance the ease and 
security of payment can provide guidance 
and insights for considering the preferred 
path forward for Hong Kong.
Everyone agrees with fair and prompt 
payment practice. A fair payment culture 
underpins any advancement in a modern 
industry. However, what actually constitutes 
fair and prompt payment is the subject 
of considerable debate and views differ 
depending on where the stakeholder in 
issue belongs within the structure of the 
construction industry. There is also no united 
voice on how to achieve it.
Through outlining and reviewing such 
options and alternatives, some views on their 
practicability and benefits for application 
in Hong Kong have been expressed. This 
analysis is by no means the conclusion of the 
subject. It is hoped that this will contribute 
to the further and focused study and 
discussion among stakeholders in the Hong 
Kong construction industry by providing a 
reasoned and objective foundation.
It is high time the construction industry 
in Hong Kong should review the question 
of security of payment, thinking more for 
the betterment of the construction industry 
in Hong Kong as a whole and less for one’s 
own immediate or short-term interests.
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